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ABSTRACT
Economic theory predicts that individual recycling behavior gravitates toward extremes—either diligent
recycling or no recycling at all.  Using a nationally representative sample of 3,158 bottled water users,
this article finds that this prediction is borne out for consumer recycling of plastic water bottles.  Both
water bottle deposits and recycling laws foster recycling through a discontinuous effect that converts
reluctant recyclers into diligent recyclers.  Within this context, a number of factors influencing recycling
emerge.  The warm glow from being both an environmentalist and an environmental group member
is about equal to the monetary value of 5 cent bottle deposits.  Respondents from states with stringent
recycling laws and bottle deposits have greater recycling rates. Consistent with recycling being a threshold
response, the efficacy of these policy interventions is greater for those who do not already recycle,
have lower income, and do not consider themselves to be environmentalists.
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Vanderbilt Law School




















Waste associated with plastic water bottles has become an issue of substantial national 
prominence.  In six years, U.S. sales of bottled water for individual consumption tripled from 
about 12 billion water bottles in 2000 to 36 billion in 2006.
1  In 2008 alone, U.S. consumption of 
bottled water was more than 28 gallons per capita, with industry wholesale dollar sales 
exceeding $11 billion.
2  Bottled water typically comes in polyethylene terephthalate (PET) 
bottles.  More than 2 million tons of PET bottles, including those for beverages other than water, 
were incinerated or left in landfills in 2006.  The Container Recycling Institute estimates that 
increasing PET recycling rates to about 85% would save more than 60 trillion BTUs and avoid 
about a million metric tons of carbon equivalent greenhouse gas emissions.  Plastic water bottles 
comprise almost half of the total PET bottle sales and represent a growing share of sales.  
However, bottle deposit laws in most states do not include these water bottles.  This paper 
examines the efficacy of the economic incentives generated by policies that encourage the 
recycling of these plastic water bottles.
3   
There are two principal policy instruments that promote water bottle recycling—bottle 
deposits and recycling laws.  Bottle deposits for plastic water bottles establish a financial 
incentive to foster recycling while recycling laws generally encourage that behavior by reducing 
the time cost and increasing the convenience cost of recycling.
4  In some instances recycling 
                                                      
1 See the Container Recycling Institute (2008) for detailed statistics through 2006. 
2 See Rodwan (2009). 
3 We do not analyze whether increased recycling of water bottles would pass a cost-benefit test.  Such an analysis 
would need to consider the implementation and operating costs of the various policies against the benefits of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing landfill space, saving natural resources through the possibility of 
reuse, and experiencing the warm glow benefits of recycling.  See, e.g., Kinnaman (2006) and Morris, Smith, and 
Hlavka (2005).  To the extent that a state or a municipality would like to increase its water bottle recycling through a 
bottle deposit bill or other recycling law, however, our analysis identifies the impact that each policy is likely to 
have on individual recycling behavior. 
4 There also may be financial incentives through penalties imposed for noncompliance if recycling is mandatory. 2 
laws may impose monetary penalties on failure to recycle properly.  Recycling laws exhibit a 
range of policy stringency, from requiring local recycling to merely defining it as a goal. 
While the economics literature on recycling behavior has been growing, this study is 
novel in its focus on individual recycling behavior for a nationally representative sample that can 
be linked to different recycling law regimes in the fifty U.S. states.
5  To date, there have been no 
comprehensive studies of plastic water bottle recycling or national studies of individual recycling 
behavior.  Most studies have focused on states or narrowly defined regions.
6  Some studies of 
material-specific recycling have used individual data, but have not analyzed the different state 
law regimes, have not used nationally representative samples, and have not focused on plastic 
water bottles specifically.
7  
Our study uses an original national data set of 3,158 households.  Data at the individual 
level make it possible to examine the determinants of recycling decisions controlling for 
household characteristics and to examine the different levels of individual recycling rates.  Many 
of the variables included in our analysis, such as whether the respondent is a member of an 
environmental organization, are unique to our recycling study.  On a theoretical basis, we predict 
                                                      
5 Jenkins et al. (2003) and Yang and Innes (2007) review previous empirical recycling studies.  Most, but not all 
studies in the literature have analyzed recycling behavior on a regional basis.  These studies include Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1996), Callan and Thomas (1997), Nester and Podolsky (1998), Hong and Adams (1999), Van Houtven 
and Morris (1999), and Suwa and Usui (2007).  Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) examine community-level recycling 
behavior using a national dataset, and Jenkins et al. (2003) analyze material specific recycling for a sample in 20 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of middle and upper-middle income households who had curbside collection 
available.  Ashenmiller (2009) used individual survey data from CA to examine the effect of bottle bills and 
concluded that they increase recycling.  
6 Three such regional studies are Saltzman et al.’s (1993) analysis of glass and newspaper recycling (by quantity) in 
53 communities in PA and NJ, Beatty et al.’s (2007) analysis of aluminum, glass, and plastic recycling (by quantity) 
in regional CA communities, and Yang and Innes’s (2007) regional Taiwan analysis of paper, metal, plastic, and 
glass recycling (by weight).   
7 Three studies using household-level data are Reschovsky and Stone’s (1994) analysis of the proportion of many 
different materials recycled in an upstate NY county, Sterner and Bartelings’ (1999) analysis of recycling (by 
weight) of materials other than plastic using regional data in Sweden, and Jenkins et al.’s (2003) analysis of the 
recycling (by proportion recycled) of newspaper, glass bottles, aluminum, plastic bottles, and yard waste by middle 
and upper income households in 20 major MSAs.  Kinnaman (2005) examines the effect on curbside recycling of 
legal contexts categorized by a survey of state officials reported in Biocycle magazine by Kaufman et al. (2004). 3 
that people gravitate toward an extreme of either being a non-recycler or a diligent recycler, a 
mechanism which can only be revealed using individual data rather than aggregative data.  
The use of individual data also makes it possible to examine the individual heterogeneity 
of the recycling responses to the incentives created by the recycling laws and bottle deposit laws 
of different states.  To capture the incentive effects of these laws, our study uses our own 
detailed categorization of state recycling statutes and bottle bills presented in Appendix B.  The 
data set enables us to answer several kinds of questions.  Are some segments of the population 
less motivated by recycling policies, and does their responsiveness hinge on the particular form 
of intervention?  Will those in upper income groups respond to the financial incentives of bottle 
deposits or be deterred by the time costs associated with recycling?  Differences in individuals’ 
valuation of the environment also may be consequential if environmentalists already recycle 
without additional financial incentives.  Our results demonstrate a substantial muting of the 
financial incentives for recycling for those with higher income levels and strong environmental 
preferences. 
The next section of this paper presents a conceptual model of recycling behavior, which 
predicts that once people begin to recycle they tend to become diligent recyclers so that 
successful policy interventions have a discontinuous effect on individual behavior.  After 
describing the sample and the recycling policy regimes, Section 3 presents overview statistics 
indicating a strong bimodal aspect to recycling behavior.  The regression analyses of the 
determinants of the fraction of bottles recycled in Section 4 and the use of curbside recycling and 
bottle returns in Section 5 provide estimates of the efficacy of the different recycling 
interventions.  Section 6 presents corroborative results on the effect of bottle deposits based on 
the natural experiments in Oregon and Connecticut during the course of survey administration.  4 
Section 7 concludes.  Incentives matter, consistent with both economic theory and the 
hypothesized discontinuous recycling decision. 
2. The Consumer’s Recycling Decision 
  Recycling decisions depend on what items the consumer has purchased.  Following the 
standard dynamic programming approach, we assume that in the first stage the consumer chooses 
the consumption mix conditional on the optimal disposal and recycling decisions in the second 
stage.  The consumer makes the purchase decisions in the initial period anticipating optimal 
disposal thereafter so that it is appropriate to analyze the second stage disposal and recycling 
decision, taking as given the prior purchase decisions.
8 
Recycling Decision Notation and Framework 
  Although not all disposal options are available in every locale, if we abstract from 
littering, there are three possible ways to dispose of plastic bottles: curb recycling, denoted by c, 
returning the bottle for deposits, d, and putting the bottles in the garbage, g. If we denote the total 
number of bottles as x, then x = c + d + g.  For each bottle returned for deposit, the consumer 
receives a unit price p.
9   
  Let the utility for each disposal mode be represented by an additively separable function 
of the environmental benefit minus the net cost of disposal.  The person’s wage rate, w, reflects 
opportunity cost of time.
10  We also assume there is no warm glow benefit from bottles that are 
                                                      
8 Similar formats that focus on the recycling stage decision are used by Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), Jenkins et 
al. (2003), and Beatty et al. (2007). Bohm (1981) considers a different model of the refund-disposal decision that 
involves the time decision of when to stop using the product and dispose of it.  Our analysis assumes that individuals 
must choose a way to dispose of their water bottles once they are empty. 
9 If the bottles are returned to a recycling center in a no deposit state, the price is zero. 
10 For simplicity, we abstract from the exogenous labor supply decision and focus on the wage rate w.  Assuming a 
fixed predetermined number of hours worked, the wage rate also serves as a measure of the level of income. 5 
not recycled but that environmental benefit that the consumer derives for each bottle recycled is 
the same whether the bottle is recycled at the curb or returned for deposit.
11   
For each recycling mode, there is a fixed cost time component as well as a time cost 
component that increases linearly with the number of bottles recycled.  Thus, the time 
commitment tc for recycling c bottles with curbside recycling is 
 t c = tc0 + tc1c ,  (1) 
and for d bottles returned for deposit it is 
 t d = td0 + td1d ,  (2) 
and for g bottles put in the garbage it is 
 t g = tg0 + tg1g .
12 (3) 
The personal cost of this time commitment is tcw, tdw, and tgw for the three different types of 
bottle disposal.  States that have effective recycling programs, such as those with convenient 
curbside recycling and accessible recycling centers, promote recycling by decreasing the 
recycling cost components.  In some instances the cost structure may be different, as when 
drinking bottled water at a sporting event or while traveling, in which case even diligent 
recyclers may not find it desirable to recycle their bottles. 
The attractiveness of any recycling option will depend on the other choices available and 
whether the particular recycling mode is already being used, in which case the fixed cost 
component of the time cost drops out.  There are many commonalities across the different 
recycling options, and these general economic aspects of the decision will be our focus here 
rather than attempting to inventory results for every disposal combination. 
 
                                                      
11This benefit term may, of course, vary with demographic characteristics such as whether the person is a member of 
an environmental group.  Kinnaman (2006) provides an overview of the literature on the utility benefit of recycling. 
12 The linearity assumption in this model is the key assumption leading to the corner solution outcome. 6 
Curbside Recycling Versus Garbage 
The recycling decisions in different contexts involve similar economic issues that can be 
illustrated by considering the binary decision of whether to recycle n bottles curbside or to put 
the bottles in the garbage, where we assume that this is the initial disposal for each mode.
13  
Curbside recycling will be more attractive if 
  en – (tc0 + tc1n)w > -(tg0 + tg1n)w .  (4) 
Recycling at the curbside is preferable if the environmental benefit exceeds any net cost in 
disposal time, or 
  en > [(tc0 – tg0) + (tc1 – tg1)n]w .  (5) 
How much people will choose to recycle will depend on a succession of marginal 
choices, but it may be preferable to adopt a common recycling strategy for all bottles.  Suppose 
that it is desirable for a consumer to recycle n bottles at the curb, and that the consumer already 
uses garbage disposal for other items so that tg0 = 0.
14  Then the overall comparison of the 
benefits of recycling these n bottles rather than putting them in the garbage is 
  en – (tc0 + tc1n)w > -tg1nw, (6) 
or 
 e  >   w t t
n
t
1 g 1 c
0 c   . (7) 
For the n + 1’st bottle, the use of curbside recycling will be preferred if 
  e – tc1w > -tg1w ,  (8) 
which can be written as  
  e > (tc1 – tg1)w .  (9) 
But since 
                                                      
13 If the consumer already uses the garbage disposal mode for other items, tg0 = 0. 
14 The analysis if no garbage disposal is already being used is generally less realistic. 7 
   w t t
n
t
1 g 1 c
0 c   > w t t 1 g 1 c  , (10) 
if inequality 7 is satisfied so that it is desirable to recycle n bottles, then it will also be desirable 
to recycle n + 1 bottles.  Because of the small incremental cost of recycling an additional bottle, 
consumers will tend to gravitate to corner solutions of no recycling or complete recycling.  
Returning bottles for deposit as opposed to disposing of the bottles in the garbage also leads to a 
similar corner solution, as does the decision to use curbside recycling or to return the bottles for 
deposit. 
Empirical Predictions 
This exploration of recycling decisions has led to several empirical predictions.  First, 
people will exhibit discrete modal choices in their recycling behavior.  Thus, to the extent that 
policies such as curbside recycling laws or bottle deposit laws are influential, people will switch 
from doing little or no recycling of that type to using that mode almost exclusively.  Because of 
this discontinuous response, there should be few individuals with intermediate levels of recycling 
for any particular recycling mode.  Second, placing a high value on the warm glow effect 
increases the attractiveness of recycling by curbside or through bottle returns as compared to 
putting the bottles in the garbage.  If the environmental utility value is identical for both 
recycling and returns, this environmental benefit component will not have a differential effect 
across those domains.  Third, bottle deposits increase the likelihood of recycling bottles. 
3. Sample Characteristics and Recycling Laws 
The data set used in the empirical analysis is from a national survey of households 
undertaken for this study by Knowledge Networks (KN) in 2008 and 2009.  The KN panel is 
based on probability sampling of both online and offline populations.  If a person does not have 
internet access or a computer, KN provides the necessary hardware and internet access.  Our 8 
survey is Web-based and was administered to a nationally representative sample, with a 71% 
response rate.
15  The characteristics of the full sample, as reported in Appendix Table A1, closely 
parallel the characteristics of the adult U.S. population.  Of the 5,213 survey participants, 3,158 
are bottled water users.
16  Based on the summary of the sample characteristics in Table A1, 
bottled water consumption is quite widespread across the population.  Compared to those who do 
not drink bottled water, bottled water drinkers are more likely to be female, younger, nonwhite, 
and have high income.  Our empirical analysis focuses on the bottled water subsample, because 
this is the population for which the recycling decision is pertinent.  While the entire survey took 
around 25 minutes, the sections on individual attitudes and practices related to bottled water and 
recycling took less than 10 minutes.  Appendix Table A2 summarizes the pertinent survey 
questions.   
While the data only pertain to the amounts of plastic water bottles recycled, the survey 
did include a recycling question that asked respondents to compare their recycling of all 
recyclable materials relative to their neighbors.  As indicated by the data in Appendix Table C1, 
the self-assessed relative degree of recycling is similar for bottled water users and those who do 
not drink bottled water.    The main result of interest is that the distribution across response 
categories is remarkably similar for those in the plastic water bottle sample and for those not in 
this group suggesting that an analysis of recycling aluminum cans or newspapers would produce 
similar results.  
                                                      
15 Our use of KN for our EPA-funded water surveys has been specifically reviewed and approved by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  The KN panel also meets the 
U.S. government’s quality standards for RDD surveys.  For additional information on the characteristics of the KN 
panel, see http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/knpanel/KNPanel-Design-Summary.pdf. 
16 To be classified as a bottled water user the person must meet two tests.  First, the person must “use bottled water 
at home, work, exercise, car, or other.”  Second, the person must have “bought water in plastic bottles in the past 
month.” 9 
The focus of our analysis is on the recycling of plastic bottles for bottled water.  As a 
result, we restrict the sample to the 3,158 people who indicated that they use bottled water.
17  The 
focal recycling question for the plastic bottles was the following: “Out of every 10 plastic bottles, 
how many would you say that you recycled or returned for reuse?”  On average, the sample 
members indicated they recycled or returned a mean of 6.0 out of 10 plastic water bottles.  This 
amount is greater than the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report of an estimate 
of total plastic bottle recycling rate of 24% in 2006 based on data from the National Association 
of PET Container Resources, which reports a 27% estimate for 2008.
18  However, those statistics 
do not pertain to the household recycling rate of plastic water bottles, which is the focus of our 
study.  The relatively low national recycling rate figures also include the 69.1% of all bottled 
water that is consumed away from home at restaurants, workplaces, hotels, sporting events, 
conventions, and other locales.
19  As indicated below, our household recycling patterns are 
comparable to those found by Jenkins et al. (2003) for areas with curbside recycling for some 
materials.
20  If, however, all sample respondents overstated their recycling rate relative to the 
GAO figure by a common factor, one would multiply all recycling rates by 0.45. 
The matter of interest is less on the average recycling rates than on how reported bottle 
return rate varies with the different recycling and deposit regimes and, in particular, whether the 
economic incentives created by these regimes influence recycling behavior.  Consideration of 
                                                      
17 The sample is restricted to the 3,158 respondents who indicated how often they recycle their bottles.  Many of the 
excluded respondents used water cooler containers that were collected on a regular basis by the supplier and 
consequently did not involve the same kind of recycling decisions being analyzed here. 
18The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009) indicated that it “did not independently verify the accuracy 
and completeness of the data provided by [the environmental nonprofit] organizations.”  The National Association 
of PET Container Resources report, which provides the details for the estimate, is available at 
http://www.napcor.com/pdf/RRate2008.pdf.  
19See http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err1/err1a.pdf.  
20 Jenkins et al. (2003) found that the majority of respondents recycled over 95% of plastic bottles.  Our results 
similarly show that a majority of respondents recycle 9 or 10 out of 10 plastic bottles.  Additionally, the findings of 
Jenkins et al. suggest a plastic bottle recycling rate of around 69% using the midpoints of their reported ranges, a 
number similar to our 60% result. 10 
relative gradations of recycling behavior in our empirical analysis should be less susceptible to 
reporting bias than statements of the absolute number of bottles recycled. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample characteristics of the variables used in the analysis.  In 
addition to data on recycling practices and state laws, the data include detailed personal 
characteristic information.  Over two-fifths of the sample consider themselves to be 
environmentalists and 8% are members of national environmental groups.
21  This proportion is 
similar for both bottled water users and non-bottle water users. Bottled water users spend about 
$11 per month on bottled water, while non-bottled water users spend no money at all, leading to 
a sample spending average of just under $8 per month on bottled water.   
States differ by the extent to which they encourage recycling either through bottle deposit 
laws and their specific recycling policies.  Bottle deposits create a direct financial incentive for 
recycling bottles for which deposits are required, which in most states do not include plastic 
water bottles.
22  The deposit rate is 5 cents per bottle, except in Michigan where the rate is 10 
cents.
23  The unit price deposit raises the price paid at the time of purchase, but for every bottle 
returned to a recycling location or to stores that accept recycled bottles, the recycler is paid the 
deposit amount.  The bottle can be recycled by anyone and need not be recycled by the original 
purchaser.
24  About 16% of the sample members reside in the states with non-water bottle 
deposit laws, and only 12% of the sample resides in the five states (California, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Maine, and Oregon) that had bottle deposit laws in 2009 that included plastic water 
bottles.   
                                                      
21These groups included Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, National Audubon Society, National Wildlife 
Federation, Nature Conservancy, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club. 
22 See Bohm (1981) for an early detailed analysis of deposit-refund systems. 
23 Separate analyses failed to demonstrate any differential effect of the higher bottle deposits in Michigan. 
24 For example, homeless people and scavengers often collect bottles from litter, garbage, and curbside recycling 
bins and return the bottles for cash.  This leeway no doubt contributes to the role of bottle deposits as an income 
supplement for the poor, which in turn decreases crime rates.  See Ashenmiller (2006, 2009, 2010). 11 
The survey inquired whether the respondent received payment for plastic bottle recycling.  
The survey responses follow the expected pattern given the bottle deposit regime in the 
respondent’s state of residence.  The theory developed earlier suggests that bottle deposit 
requirements for other types of bottles will increase the recycling of water bottles.  We will test 
whether bottle deposits lead consumers to sort their garbage and bring the bottles for which there 
are deposits to a recycling center.  To the extent that there are fixed costs associated with 
returning bottles to a recycling center, the additional costs of also bringing the plastic water 
bottles may be less than if there were no bottle deposit policies.  Recycling centers in states with 
bottle deposit requirements may also include opportunities to recycle plastic water bottles even 
though there is no payment for such recycling. 
There is substantial diversity in the structure of recycling laws across states.  State laws 
often include one or more regulatory components, summarized in Appendix B.  For example, a 
state with mandatory recycling may also include recycling goals.  For purposes of categorization, 
we treat states hierarchically in terms of the most stringent component in the state’s recycling 
law.  States are grouped into those that have mandatory recycling or that require an opportunity 
for recycling for all citizens, those that require local communities to have a recycling plan, those 
that have recycling goals but lack a specific plan, and, finally, those that have no recycling law. 
Our empirical analysis indicates that recycling goals alone do not have a statistically 
significant positive effect on recycling whereas the other three recycling laws do.  Thus, for 
purposes of our first two overview tables we will denote “effective recycling laws” as those 
states with mandatory recycling, opportunities for recycling, or regional waste management 
plans with recycling considerations.   12 
Table 2 summarizes the recycling practices for water bottle users under different 
recycling regimes.  The average number of bottles out of 10 that are recycled rises from 4.30 for 
states with no effective recycling law and no water bottle deposit law to 5.86 if the state also has 
an effective recycling law and to 8.59 if the state also has a water bottle deposit law.  All states 
with a water bottle deposit law also have an effective recycling law. 
The most prevalent form of recycling is at curbside. Almost half of all water bottle users 
use curbside recycling for some of their bottles, while only one-fifth of the sample returns bottles 
for deposit or takes them to a recycling center.  In states with water bottle deposit laws, about 
half return the bottles for deposit, and the percentage using curbside recycling is not substantially 
lower than in states without such bottle deposit laws.  
The distribution of the number of bottles recycled shown in Table 3 is consistent with the 
theoretical model in which recycling behavior follows a discrete threshold rather than a 
continuous process.  For all bottled water users, 29.1% recycle 0 bottles out of 10, while 42.0% 
recycle 10 out of 10.  The next most prevalent levels of recycling are 9 and 8 bottles out of 10, as 
people attempt to recycle most but not all of their bottles, perhaps because they are drinking the 
water in the car or at some other location.  Interestingly, there is minimal clustering of responses 
at 5 out of 10, which one might have expected if respondents were focusing on salient numerical 
responses rather than attempting to assess their actual recycling amount. 
Columns 2-4 in Table 3 break the sample by three recycling regime categories.  The first 
recycling policy shown in column 3 of Table 3 is the presence of an effective recycling law but 
no water bottle deposit law.  Such a law shifts the mass of the distribution, decreasing the 
percentage of respondents who indicate that they do not recycle at all, and increasing the 
percentage who indicate 100% recycling.  As column 5 indicates, almost the entire mass shift is 13 
from 0 out of 10 bottles recycled to 9 or 10 bottles recycled.  The addition of water bottle 
deposits is shown in column 4.  As the calculation of the differences in column 6 indicates, there 
is a negligible incremental effect of water bottle deposits except at the tails of the distribution, 
where the percent of those indicating zero recycling drops by 24.7 percentage points and the 
percent indicating complete recycling increases by 26.2 points. 
25 
The consistent pattern across all these results is that most people adopt a recycling 
strategy of either being a diligent recycler or not recycling at all.  The introduction of effective 
recycling laws or water bottle deposit laws consequently has a discontinuous effect across the 
distribution of recycling patterns as water bottle users shift recycling levels through a threshold 
transformation of behavior. 
4. Determinants of the Total Recycling Amount 
The first series of regression analyses focuses on the proportion of water bottles recycled.  
To demonstrate robustness across analyses, four different estimation approaches are used.  The 
first column in Table 4 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for which we report 
robust heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.  To take into account the bounded nature of 
the responses that cluster at 0 and 10, the second column of Table 4 presents the two-sided Tobit 
regression estimates.  Finally, one might hypothesize that respondents were not giving precise 
estimates of the actual number of bottles recycled but were simply indicating their relative 
degree of recycling and perhaps overstating the actual number of bottles recycled.  We explore 
                                                      
25 This efficacy of water bottle deposits is consistent with Ashenmiller’s (2009) finding that bottle deposit laws 
increase the amount of material recycled at Santa Barbara, CA redemption centers.  Beatty et al. (2007) find that 
curbside recycling largely cannibalizes the effect of drop-off recycling centers when incomes are high or 
unemployment is low.  Their analysis is within state for California, but if the comparison instead is with states with 
no effective recycling law, then the incremental effect of such recycling policies potentially may be greater.  Several 
previous studies focused on bag/tag programs and pricing by weight programs.  Reschovsky and Stone (1994), 
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), and Jenkins et al. (2003) found no statistically 
significant effect of unit pricing on recycling.  Van Houtven and Morris (1999) found that unit pricing affected 
whether people recycle but not the amount of recycling. 14 
this possibility in two ways.  The third column of results in Table 4 presents the ordered logit 
estimates, for which the three ordered categories are 0, 1-7, and 8-10 out of 10 bottles.  The final 
column of Table 4 reports probit estimates, for which the dependent binary variable is equal to 1 
if the individual recycles 1-10 out of 10 bottles and 0 if the individual does not recycle any 
bottles.
26  These formulations of the model address the possibility that the responses have ordinal 
rather than cardinal significance or are binary, indicating only whether someone is a recycler or 
not.
27  Moreover, the categories reflect the different discontinuous recycling groupings of 
consumers.  Because of the strong parallels across the four analyses, the discussion here focuses 
on the OLS estimates where the coefficients reflect the linear impact of the variable on recycling 
behavior. 
The first pair of policy variables pertains to the state’s bottle deposit laws.  The deposit 
state variable is a 0-1 indicator variable for whether the state has a bottle deposit law.  A second 
0-1 variable then indicates if the deposit law covers water bottles.  Both of the state deposit 
variables raise the number of bottles recycled.  The broad deposit variable raises the number of 
water bottles recycled number by 0.6 out of 10 bottles, while the presence of a specific water 
bottle deposit law increases plastic water bottle recycling by 2.1 out of 10 bottles.  Together, 
consumers in states with both laws recycle an additional 2.7 out of 10 bottles, controlling for all 
other influences, including the recycling law regime. 
The next set of three variables pertains to the state recycling law.  The two most stringent 
forms of laws—mandatory recycling and required opportunities for recycling—are combined 
into a single category of 14 states plus the District of Columbia because the small number of the 
                                                      
26 Other ordered logit specifications yielded similar results.  For example, treating each of the 0 to 10 responses as a 
separate ordered response leads to estimates that have the same signs and statistical significance as those reported 
here. 
27 Jenkins et al. (2003) also use an ordered logit approach to analyze categorical responses for recycling behavior 
that they collapsed into three gradations of recycling rates.  Similarly, Halvorsen (2008) uses an ordered probit 
model. 15 
component groups makes it impossible to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for these two 
categories are equal.
28  These laws should have the greatest influence since they have the greatest 
effect on the costs of recycling as they make available low cost recycling options, and in the case 
of mandatory recycling, impose penalties on those who fail to recycle.  Laws that require either 
mandatory recycling or the opportunity to recycle increase recycling by 1.9 out of every 10 
bottles.   
Laws that only require regional waste management plans with recycling considerations 
also have a significant positive effect on recycling, boosting the recycling out of 10 bottles by 0.7 
bottles.  This effect has a significantly smaller point estimate than of the 1.9 effect of the more 
stringent mandatory/opportunity recycling laws.
29 
The weakest of the recycling law variables is for states that have a waste reduction goal, 
but no required action.  This variable does not have a statistically significant effect compared to 
the no recycling law states.
30  The pattern of coefficient magnitudes is consistent with the relative 
stringency of the laws.  Mandatory recycling and required recycling opportunity laws have the 
greatest effect, followed by planning laws, with no statistically significant effect of the weakest 
laws that are limited to specifying a waste reduction goal.  Because of the significant effects on 
recycling of mandatory/opportunity laws and planning regimes we refer to these as the effective 
recycling laws. 
Next we consider user demographics on recycling.  Higher income levels increase the 
time opportunity costs of recycling.  Income may also influence the value the consumer places 
on recycling.    The effect of income on the number of bottles recycled is positive, but small, 
                                                      
28 The F test had a value of 1.66 with a probability value of 0.1977.  Similarly, Jenkins et al. (2003) found that for 
plastic bottles generally, mandatory recycling had no additional effect when curbside recycling is already available. 
29 The pertinent F value is 32.40, with a probability value 0.0000. 
30 Planning states are more effective than goals states.  The F statistic for the test for whether the planning variable 
coefficient equals that of the goals variable is 9.81, with a probability value of 0.0017. 16 
suggesting that the increased opportunity costs are not sufficient to totally offset the higher 
amount of recycling among higher income respondents.
31    Individual education has a positive 
effect on recycling, which serves both as a measure of the respondent’s knowledge of available 
recycling options as well as lifetime wealth.
32  
The value that the respondents place on environmental quality is captured directly by 
whether the respondents consider themselves to be environmentalists as well as by whether the 
respondent is a member of a major national environmental organization.
33  Each of these 
variables has the expected positive effect, with people who consider themselves to be 
environmentalists recycling an additional 1.6 out of 10 bottles, and members of environmental 
organizations recycling an additional 0.5 bottles after taking into account the effect of being an 
environmentalist and other variables. 
To the extent that these environmental variables correspond to the warm glow benefit 
from recycling, then it is possible to monetize this effect.  The water bottle deposit variable 
reflects the inducement of a 5 cent per bottle payment.  Being a self-described environmentalist 
is 77% as influential, or equivalent to about a 4 cent per bottle value, while being a member of an 
environmental organization is 21% as effective, or a value of about 1 cent per bottle.  Since 
environmental organization members are also self-described environmentalist, their combined 
warm glow benefit is 5 cents per bottle, or almost equivalent to the effect of the bottle deposit.  
Several of the other personal characteristic variables are influential as well.  Recycling 
rates increase with age, are lower for African Americans, and are higher for larger households.  
                                                      
31 Higher income respondents may also live in communities with more access to recycling options that minimize 
opportunity costs (income is positively correlated with curbside recycling). 
32 In contrast, income and education did not significantly affect plastic bottle recycling in Jenkins et al.’s (2003) 
study that was restricted to primarily middle and upper income groups.  Collins et al. (2006) found that recycling 
rates increase with income in Scotland.  Kinnaman (2005) found no significant effect of the percent of state residents 
with a high school diploma on the percent of state waste that is recycled. 
33 Previous studies concerned with the household’s pro-environment preferences include Halvorsen’s (2008) study 
of recycling in Norway. 17 
Recycling rates increase for homeowners, but that may reflect the greater availability of curbside 
recycling and convenient recycling locations for this group.  The volume of recycling as 
measured by the dollars spent on bottled water does not have a significant effect on the percent 
of bottles recycled, but including this variable nevertheless serves an important role in the 
analysis to account for the volume of bottled water purchased.
34  Otherwise, variables such as 
income might be capturing the quantity effect.  Use of bottled water in the car does not 
significantly reduce recycling even though recycling may be more difficult for such users, and 
reusing water bottles does not affect the recycling rate. 
The regional variables are influential and indicate the considerable geographic 
differences in recycling rates.  Urban and suburban residents of metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs) recycle an additional 1.3 out of 10 additional bottles, a result consistent with the greater 
availability of curbside recycling and convenient recycling centers in such locales.  In addition, 
state laws generally exempt rural areas from recycling requirements.  
To explore these differences further, Appendix Table C2 reports separate regressions for 
the urban (MSA) and non-urban subsamples.
35  The principal differences are that state deposit 
laws and state recycling planning requirements significantly increase plastic water bottle 
recycling in urban areas but not outside of these areas.  Plastic water bottle deposits are equally 
effective in each context.  
The efficacy of the policy measures in promoting recycling behavior also may vary 
across the populations and in different policy regimes.  Table 5 reports selected coefficients from 
additional regressions including interactions of the policy variables and both income and whether 
the respondent is an environmentalist.  Given a threshold model, we expect negative interactions 
                                                      
34 The dollars spent variable remains statistically insignificant if the income variable is omitted from the equation. 
35 The estimated parameters from the two regressions differ statistically, with an F (32, 3094) statistic of 3.30 and a 
probability value of 0.0000. 18 
between positive factors, because either one can drive one over the threshold.  The negative 
interactive effect of income and water bottle deposit laws implies that higher income people are 
less likely to recycle their bottles.
36  Having a water bottle deposit law also reduces the marginal 
effect of being an environmentalist by more than a half.
37  Because environmentalists will 
already have an incentive to recycle without a financial inducement, bottle bills are less effective 
among this group.  On balance, the self described environmentalists return 0.7 additional bottles 
out of 10 in states with bottled water deposit laws.  The separate regressions for 
environmentalists and non-environmentalists reported in Appendix Table C2 indicate many 
parallels in behavior with one notable difference being that the financial inducements of general 
state deposit laws do not significantly boost plastic water bottle recycling for environmentalists, 
but are effective for non-environmentalists.
38  The other interaction terms in Table 5 are not 
statistically significant, as the effect of the water bottle deposit variable on recycling exhibits 
more individual heterogeneity than do the other recycling law variables.  
5. Determinants of Curbside Recycling and Returning Bottles for Deposit 
While both recycling laws and bottle deposit laws should each increase the degree to 
which people recycle plastic water bottles, the composition of the recycling should differ.  Laws 
that increase the availability of curb pickups reduce the costs of curb recycling relative to 
returning the bottles to a recycling center and should have a positive effect on curb recycling and 
a negative effect on returning bottles for deposit.  Likewise, water bottle deposit laws increase 
the economic benefits of returning bottles for deposit, consequently increasing the likelihood of 
returning the bottles and decreasing the attractiveness of using curbside pickup for which there is 
                                                      
36  The income effect pattern is consistent with Ashenmiller’s (2009) finding that bottle returns are a relatively more 
important income source for people in lower income groups. 
37 A comparable interaction with being a member of an environmental organization did not have a statistically 
significant effect and is not included in Table 5’s regressions. 
38 One can reject the hypothesis that the estimated parameters from the two regressions are the same, with an F (31, 
3080) statistic of 6.21 and a probability value of 0.0000. 19 
no payment.  The analysis below tests these propositions by focusing on respondent answers to a 
question regarding two forms of recycling behavior over the past month.
39 
The probit regression for whether the respondent used curbside recycling for plastic water 
bottles in the past month is reported in Table 6, where all coefficients have been transformed to 
reflect marginal probabilities.  State deposit laws generally do not significantly affect curbside 
recycling.  Residents of states that have mandatory recycling or opportunity for recycling laws 
have a 0.26 higher probability of using curbside recycling for plastic water bottles, while states 
with recycling plans have a 0.07 higher probability of using curbside recycling than residents of 
states with no recycling laws.  The presence of recycling goals has no statistically significant 
effect on use of curbside recycling.
40 
Many of the other patterns shown in Table 6 parallel the earlier results with respect to the 
number of bottles recycled.  All recycling laws variables except for those restricted to recycling 
goals boost curbside recycling. The use of curbside recycling is an increasing function of 
income, education, age, whether the respondent is an environmentalist, and whether the 
respondent lives in a MSA.   
We also interacted the various legal and policy regimes with income and whether the 
individual is an environmentalist.  The mean interaction effect between mandatory or 
opportunity laws and whether the respondent is an environmentalist on curbside recycling is 
about 0.01 with a standard error of 0.04 and z-statistic of 0.351. The interaction effect ranged, 
however, from a negative 0.04 to a positive 0.06, with the z-statistic as high as 2.429 for some 
                                                      
39 See Appendix Table A2 for the survey question wording. 
40 Kinnaman (2005) found that mandatory beverage container deposits and recycling goals do not significantly affect 
the availability of curbside recycling, while laws imposing curbside recycling requirements do increase the 
availability of curbside recycling.  Additionally, he found no statistically significant effects on the availability of 
curbside recycling of several other laws: bans on yard waste from landfills, bans of recyclable materials from 
landfills, tax credits for facilities, or requirements that government agencies purchase recycled material. 20 
probability levels of using curbside recycling.
41 The other interaction effects were never 
statistically significant. 
The presence of bottle deposits for plastic water bottles should foster the returns of these 
bottles.  Table 7 includes three sets of probit estimates for the probability that the respondent 
returns bottles for deposit or to the recycling center and for the two components of this 
probability—whether the respondent returned the bottles for deposit, presumably to a store 
where such bottles are purchased, and when the respondent returned the bottles to a recycling 
center.   
The overall return probability for plastic bottles increases by 0.10 if the state is a general 
bottle deposit state.  Since all plastic water bottle states also require deposits for other bottles, the 
additional 0.15 probability of bottle returns in a water bottle deposit state implies an overall 0.25 
probability of returning plastic water bottles in states with water bottle deposits.  Financial 
incentives to return bottles are effective, and the presence of other deposit requirements also 
boosts the return rate because there will be a greater total payoff to bottle returns.  In terms of the 
composition of the influence, the water bottle deposit variable has a much stronger influence on 
returning bottles to the recycling center than it does on returning bottles for deposit.  This greater 
marginal effect may be because returning bottles for deposit to the store does not involve 
additional fixed costs if a trip was already planned for shopping. 
Bottles recycled at curbside will not give consumers a financial payoff, but the presence 
of curbside recycling in providing the environmental benefit may reduce the relative utility of 
returning the bottles.  Indeed, for respondents in states with the strongest recycling laws that 
provide for mandatory recycling or the opportunity to recycle, there is a 0.04 lower probability of 
returning the bottles to a recycling center or for a deposit.  This effect reduces the benefit of 
                                                      
41 This analysis uses the Stata command “inteff” per Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004).  21 
water bottle deposits by about one-fourth.  Recycling planning law states have a small significant 
negative effect on returns for deposit.  
The principal demographic factors that influence deposit returns are income and whether 
the respondent is an environmentalist.  Income has a negative effect because the time cost of 
bottle returns is higher and the financial gains from returning bottles for money are less 
consequential for those in higher income groups.  Environmentalists are more likely to return the 
bottles for deposit.  Finally, the interaction results indicate that being an environmentalist and 
having higher income reduces the average efficacy of water bottle deposits on returning bottles 
for deposit or returning bottles to a recycling center.
42   
6. Effects of Law Changes  
The results indicate that recycling rates are higher in states with stringent recycling law or 
deposit policies.  It is possible, however, that states that initiated more stringent or expansive 
legal measures already had many diligent recyclers, though the empirical analysis controlled for 
many contributing factors such as whether the person is an environmentalist.  To investigate this 
question of causation, we take advantage of two legal changes that occurred during the 
administration of the survey.  Specifically, Oregon and Connecticut both added water bottles to 
their deposit bills in 2009.  The sample from these states includes 68 observations from 2008 and 
37 from 2009, thus providing data on recycling behavior for Oregon and Connecticut both before 
and after they each implemented their expanded bottle bills.  Although the sample of households 
experiencing changes is modest, the results are consistent with previous evidence of recycling 
responses to plastic water bottle deposits. 
                                                      
42 The inteff command calculates the mean interaction effect of water deposits and being an environmentalist as        
-0.084 with mean standard error 0.048 and mean z-statistic -1.730.  The mean interaction effect of water deposits 
and having higher income is -0.007 with mean standard error 0.005 and mean z-statistic -1.285.  We also interacted 
water deposits with mandatory/opportunity laws but we do not report the results because the negative interaction 
coefficient was never statistically significant.  22 
Oregon 
  Oregon implemented its bottle bill expansion on January 1, 2009.  The sample includes 
38 individuals before the expansion and 14 individuals surveyed in October 2009, nine months 
after the expansion.  Table 8 summarizes the bottle recycling breakdown for those two groups.  
After the expansion, mean water bottle recycling increased from 7.2 to 8.5 bottles out of 10.  
Specifically, about 13% more people became diligent recyclers after the change.  Analysis of 
differences in recycling rates within Oregon before and after the bottle deposit law, however, 
indicates that the changes are not statistically significant.
43  As with the earlier results, there is a 
pronounced shift in the mass of the distribution from people who did not recycle at all to the 
diligent recycling group. Table 9 presents the difference-in-difference regression results.  
Although the interaction term between 2009 and Oregon has a positive coefficient, it is not 
statistically significant at the usual levels for the analysis of the number out of 10 bottles 
recycled.   
The percentage of respondents who return their bottles for deposit exhibits a remarkable 
shift after the introduction of plastic water bottle deposits. As indicated by the data in the final 
column of Table 8, that percentage rises by almost 50 percent.  Moreover, the difference-in-
difference analysis of the probability of returning bottles for deposit in Table 9 also indicates a 
positive and statistically significant effect of introducing plastic water bottle deposits.
44 
Connecticut 
  Connecticut’s bottle bill expansion was implemented on October 1, 2009.  The sample 
included information from Connecticut residents between October 16 and October 27 in 2009, 
                                                      
43 The t-statistic was -1.08, with a one-sided test probability value of 0.1421.   
44 The notes to Table 9 summarize the return for deposit inteff results, which are consistent with the results for the 
simple means tests.  The decrease in the number of respondents indicating that they curb recycle was not statistically 
significant. 
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resulting in 30 CT individuals before the change and 23 individuals about two weeks after the 
enactment of plastic water bottle deposits.  Consequently, there may not have been sufficient 
time for the full effects of the policy change to be manifested, as 13 of the 23 people were 
interviewed only two weeks after the change.  Of the 23 individuals interviewed after the change, 
9 of these answered questions on their recycling behavior both before and after the change.  
There is evidence of substantial awareness of the policy shift as 21 out of the 23 interviewed 
after the change indicated that they were aware that Connecticut recently included water bottles 
in its deposit bill.   
Table 8 summarizes the recycling behavior in Connecticut before and after the change.
45  
The level of recycling in CT increased from 8.0 to about 9.0 bottles out of 10, although this 
change was not statistically significant.
46  The increase in the frequency of diligent recyclers who 
recycle 8-10 out of 10 bottles exceeded the increase in the non-recycling percentage. 
Pooled Oregon and Connecticut Experiments 
  Pooling the results from CT and OR increases the number of people who experienced the 
policy shift of the introduction of water bottle deposits.  The mean increase in recycling rates 
shown in Table 8 is statistically significant.
47  The differences-in-differences regressions for both 
the number of bottles recycled and whether people return bottles for deposit both indicate effects 
consistent with the efficacy of water bottle deposits. The regressions for the number of bottles 
recycled out of 10 in Table 9 yield interaction effects that exceed the estimated standard errors, 
and recycling rates are higher in CT and OR in 2009 in the Tobit results at about the 0.10 level, 
                                                      
45 We also analyzed the Connecticut residents that were aware of the change and the nine individuals interviewed 
before and after the change.  The composition of the results was similar to the composition for the overall sample 
from Connecticut, and also not significant, so we do not report those in Table 8. 
46 The t-statistic was 1.16, with a one-sided test probability value of 0.1261.  The increase in the number of 
respondents indicating that they return bottles for deposit after the bottle bill extension was also not statistically 
significant, with a t-statistic of 0.27 and a one-sided test probability value of 0.3933.  Changes in the number of 
respondents indicating that they curb recycle are also not statistically significant. 
47 The t-statistic was 1.76, with a two-sided test probability value of 0.0806.  24 
one-sided test.
48  A much stronger indication of the efficacy of the plastic water bottle deposits is 
the results in Table 9 for whether the respondent returned the bottles for deposit.  The interaction 
of the 2009 variable with the two states that introduced this policy is positive and statistically 
significant at the usual level.     
The overall thrust of the analysis of the water bottle deposit experiments is to reinforce 
the implications of the earlier cross sectional results.  The observed patterns of changes in 
recycling behavior are consistent with the efficacy of the bottle deposit policies.  The statistical 
significance of the effects for the pooled OR and CT samples in the differences-in-differences 
analysis is quite striking given that only 37 members of the sample of 3,158 experienced the 
policy change, and 23 of these 37 are from CT, where the policy was implemented at the start of 
the survey month.  
7. Conclusion 
  Water bottle deposits and recycling laws foster recycling efforts in different ways.  The 
bottle deposits provide a financial inducement to recycle, while the recycling laws reduce the 
time costs by providing curbside recycling and convenient recycling centers.  Recycling laws 
also may include financial penalties for noncompliance.  We find both water bottle deposits and 
recycling laws to be effective.  Moreover, the strength of effects for the recycling laws follows 
the degree of stringency of these measures.   
The analysis of the interaction between factors testifies to the diminishing marginal 
efficacy of recycling incentives as predicted by a threshold model of response at the individual 
level.  Mandatory recycling laws offer only modest recycling gains compared to planning laws.  
Self-described environmentalists are more likely to recycle without bottle deposits so that these 
                                                      
48 The probability value on the pooled Oregon and Connecticut interaction term in the reported Tobit regression is 
0.109. 25 
interventions have less effect on their recycling behavior than on less environmentally oriented 
respondents.  For people in upper income groups, the financial inducements provided by bottle 
deposits are less effective, and the time costs of taking bottles to recycling centers loom large. 
The central role of economic analysis in predicting the consumer response manifests 
perhaps most clearly in the stark pattern of individual recycling activity.  For most policy 
interventions, one would expect modest policy impacts throughout the range of behavior.  Thus, 
non-recyclers would become modest recyclers, and modest recyclers would become more 
diligent recyclers.  This kind of continuous policy influence is not borne out empirically.  
Instead, the observed shifts reflect starker changes in behavior that are consistent with the 
economic structure of the recycling decision and how policies will influence this decision.  
Given the high fixed costs associated with recycling efforts, the hypothesis generated from 
rational economic behavior theory is that people will tend to gravitate toward extremes in their 
efforts, recycling either a few or most of their bottles.  Empirically, this prediction is borne out, 
as there are few intermediate recyclers.  Both recycling laws and bottle deposit laws have 
discontinuous effects on recycling behavior.  In each case, the measures have a transformative 
effect, shifting individual consumers from not recycling at all to becoming committed recyclers.  
Consistent with our result that people respond in a discontinuous manner to recycling incentives, 
policies have their greatest effect among those who would not already choose to recycle. 26 
References 
Ashenmiller, Bevin. 2006. “The Effect of Income on Recycling Behavior in the Presence of a 
Bottle Law: New Empirical Results,” working paper. 
_____. 2009. “Cash Recycling, Waste Disposal Costs, and the Incomes of the Working Poor: 
Evidence from California,” 85 Land Economics 539-51.   
_____. 2010. “Externalities from Recycling Laws: Evidence from Crime Rates,” 12(1) American 
Law and Economics Review 245-61. 
Beatty, Timothy K.M., Peter Berck, and Jay P. Shimshack. 2007. “Curbside Recycling in the 
Presence of Alternatives,” 45 Economic Inquiry 739-55.  
Bohm, Peter. 1981. Deposit-Refund Systems: Theory and Applications to Environmental, 
Conservation, and Consumer Policy. Published for Resources for the Future, Inc. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bottle Bill Resource Guide, www.bottlebill.org/about.htm. 
Callan, Scott and Janet Thomas. 1997. “The Impact of State and Local Policies on the Recycling 
Effort,” 23 Eastern Economic Journal 411- 24. 
Collins, Alan, Richard O’Doherty, and Martin C. Snell. 2006. “Household Participation in Waste 
Recycling: Some National Survey Evidence from Scotland,” 49 Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 121-40. 
Container Recycling Institute. 2008. “Wasting and Recycling Trends: Conclusions from CRI’s 
2008 Beverage Market Data Analysis,” http://www.container-
recycling.org/assets/pdfs/reports/2008-BMDA-conclusions.pdf.  
Derksen, Linda, and John Gartrell. 1993. “The Social Context of Recycling,” 58 American 
Sociological Review 434–42. 27 
Fullerton, Don, and Thomas C. Kinnaman. 1996. “Household Responses to Pricing Garbage by 
the Bag,” 86 American Economic Review 971–83. 
Gaba, Jeffrey M., and Donald W. Stever. 2008. Law of Solid Waste, Pollution Prevention and 
Recycling. Eagan, MN: Thomson/West. 
Halvorsen, Bente. 2008. “Effects of Norms and Opportunity Cost of Time on Household 
Recycling,” 84 Land Economics 501-16. 
Hong, Seonghoon, Richard M. Adams, and H. Alan Love. 1993. “An Economic Analysis of 
Household Recycling of Solid Waste: The Case Study of Portland, Oregon,” 25 Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 136–46. 
Hong, Seonghoon, and Richard M. Adams. 1999. “Household Responses to Price Incentives for 
Recycling: Some Further Evidence,” 75 Land Economics 505–14. 
Jenkins, Robin R., Salvador A. Martinez, Karen Palmer, and Michael J. Podolsky. 2003. “The 
Determinants of Household Recycling: A Material-Specific Analysis of Recycling 
Program Features and Unit Pricing,” 45 Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 294-318.  
Kaufman, Scott M., Nora Goldstein, Karsten Millrath, and Nickolas J. Themelis. 2004. “The 
State of Garbage in America,” 45 BioCycle 31-41. 
Kinnaman, Thomas C. 2005. “Why do Municipalities Recycle?,” 5 Topics in Economic Analysis 
and Policy http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol15/iss1/art5. 
____. 2006. “Examining the Justification for Residential Recycling,” 20 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 219-32. 
Kinnaman, Thomas C., and Don Fullerton. 2000. “Garbage and Recycling with Endogenous 
Local Policy,” 48 Journal of Urban Economics 419-42. 28 
Morris, Jeffrey, Bill Smith, and Rick Hlavka. 2005. “Economic and Environmental Benefits of a 
Deposit System for Beverage Containers in Washington State,” Prepared for City of 
Tacoma Solid Waste Management, http://www.container-
recycling.org/assets/pdfs/reports/2004-EconEnviroWA.pdf.  
Nestor, Deborah Vaughn, and Michael J. Podolsky. 1998. “Assessing Incentive-Based 
Environmental Policies for Reducing Household Waste Disposal,” 16 Contemporary 
Economic Policy 401-12. 
Norton, Edward C., Hua Wang, and Chunrong Ai. 2004. “Computing Interaction Effects and 
Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models,” 4 Stata Journal 154-67. 
Porter, Richard C. 1983. “Michigan’s Experience with Mandatory Deposits on Beverage 
Containers,” 59 Land Economics 177-94. 
Reschovsky, James D., and Sarah E. Stone. 1994. “Market Incentives to Encourage Household 
Waste Recycling: Paying for What You Throw Away,” 13 Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 120-39. 
Rodwan, Jr., John G. 2009. “Confronting Challenges: U.S. and International Bottled Water 
Developments and Statistics for 2008,” Bottled Water Reporter 12-8. 
Saltzman, Cynthia, Vijaya G. Duggal, and Mary L. Williams. 1993. “Income and the Recycling 
Effort: A Maximization Problem,” 15 Energy Economics 33-8. 
Simmons, Phil, Nora Goldstein, Scott M. Kaufman, Nickolas J. Themelis, and James Thompson, 
Jr. 2006. “The State of Garbage in America,” 47 BioCycle  26-43.    
Sterner, Thomas, and Heleen Bartelings. 1999. “Household Waste Management in a Swedish 
Municipality: Determinants of Waste Disposal, Recycling and Composting,” 13 
Environmental and Resource Economics 473–91. 29 
Suwa, Tatsuo, and Takehiro Usui. 2007. “Estimation of Garbage Reduction and Recycling 
Promotion under the Containers and Packaging Recycling Law and Garbage Pricing,” 8 
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 239-54. 
Tchobanoglous, George, and Frank Kreith. 2002. Handbook of Solid Waste Management, 2nd 
ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2003. “Analysis and Findings of The Gallup 
Organization’s Drinking Water Customer Satisfaction Survey,” Office of Groundwater 
and Drinking Water, 
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/ccr/pdfs/tools_survey_gallup_customersatification2003.pdf.  
____. 2007. “Municipal Solid Waste in the United States: 2007 Facts and Figures,” 
http://www.epa.gov/waste/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw07-rpt.pdf.  
____. 2008. “Factoids: Drinking Water and Ground Water Statistics for 2008,” Office of Water, 
EPA 816-K-08-004,  www.epa.gov/safewater/data. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2009. “Bottled Water:  FDA Safety and Consumer 
Protections Are Often Less Stringent Than Comparable EPA Protections for Tap Water, 
GAO-09-610,” Washington, D.C.: GAO  
Van Houtven, George L., and Glenn E. Morris. 1999. “Household Behavior Under Alternative 
Pay-As-You-Throw Systems for Solid Waste Disposal,” 75 Land Economics 515-37. 
Yang, Hai-Lan, and Robert Innes. 2007. “Economic Incentives and Residential Waste 
Management in Taiwan: An Empirical Investigation,” 37 Environmental and Resource 
Economics 489-519. 
 30 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
 
 
 Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Dependent variables     
Number/10 plastic bottles recycled  6.0811  4.3849 
Use curb recycling  0.4624  0.4987 
Return to recycling station/for deposit  0.2130  0.4095 
Return bottles for deposit  0.0414  0.1991 
Return to recycling station  0.1820  0.3859 
State law variables    
State has deposit law  0.2806  0.4494 
State has deposit law covering water bottles  0.1212  0.3264 
State has mandatory recycling or provides an 
opportunity to recycle  0.3566 0.4790 
State requires a regional recycling plan  0.4362  0.4960 
State requires a recycling goal  0.0357  0.1855 
Personal characteristics    
Income/10,000 6.0633  4.1846 
Highest income category (over $175,000)  0.0267  0.1611 
Years of education  13.7720  2.5946 
Considers self an environmentalist  0.4284  0.4949 
Environmental organization member  0.0817  0.2739 
Age 48.8362  16.2024 
Gender: Female  0.5189  0.4997 
Race: Black  0.1003  0.3005 
Race: Asian  0.0182  0.1338 
Race: American Indian  0.0129  0.1126 
Race: Other  0.0481  0.2141 
Hispanic 0.0953  0.2937 
Household size  2.5191  1.4230 
Homeowner 0.7654  0.4238 
Married 0.5818  0.4933 
Household head  0.8210  0.3834 
Urban (lives in a MSA)  0.8335  0.3726 
Northeast 0.1895  0.3920 
South 0.3503  0.4771 
West 0.2193  0.4138 
Midwest 0.2409  0.4277 
$/month spent on bottled water  7.9586  9.8112 
Use bottled water in car  0.3721  0.4834 
Times reuse bottles  1.2220  0.2078 
Year 2009  0.2603  0.4388 31 
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a Notes:  “Effective recycling law” is either a mandatory recycling or opportunity to recycle law or a 
planning law.  All states with a water deposit law (CA, HI, ME, OR, CT) have either a mandatory 
recycling or opportunity to recycle law or a planning law. 
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sample  100 20.4 53.7  12.8     
0 29.1  46.4  31.1  6.4  -15.3 -24.7 
1 1.5  2.2  1.4  1.0  -0.8 -0.4 
2 2.4  2.6  2.7  0.5  0.1 -2.2 
3 1.2  0.6  1.4  1.5  0.8  0.1 
4 1.3  1.2  1.4  0.5  0.2 -0.9 
5 3.6  4.2  3.7  2.5  -0.5 -1.2 
6 1.7  1.9  1.4  2.2  -0.5  0.8 
7 1.7  2.2  1.5  1.5  -0.7  0 
8 6.6  6.5  6.6  6.4  0.1 -0.2 
9 8.9  5.6  9.3  11.6  3.7  2.3 
10 42.0  26.6  39.6  65.8  13.0  26.2 
            












       
a Notes:  Sample size is 3,158 respondents.  “Effective recycling law” is either a mandatory 
recycling or opportunity to recycle (M/O) law, or a planning law.  All states with a water deposit 
law (CA, HI, ME, OR, CT) have either a M/O law or a planning law.       
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Table 4:  Regressions of Number of Bottles Recycled
a 
 
  Number out of 10 bottles  Ordered 
coding 




  OLS Tobit  Ordered  Logit  Probit 
        
State has deposit law  0.574  1.741  0.237  0.084 
 (0.228)**  (0.747)**  (0.135)*  (0.026)***
State has deposit law covering 
water bottles  2.124  7.721  1.467  0.194 
 (0.326)*** (1.199)*** (0.226)***  (0.028)***
State has mandatory recycling 
or provides an opportunity to 
recycle 1.907  5.919  1.033  0.169 
 (0.223)*** (0.708)*** (0.116)***  (0.021)***
State requires a recycling plan  0.733  2.162  0.351  0.067 
 (0.229)*** (0.699)*** (0.114)***  (0.023)***
State requires a recycling goal  -0.467  -1.644  -0.166  -0.040 
 (0.402)  (1.307)  (0.217)  (0.046) 
Income/10,000 0.075  0.187  0.039  0.010 
 (0.021)*** (0.071)*** (0.012)***  (0.003)***
Highest income category  -0.509  -1.364  -0.278  -0.090 
 (0.389)  (1.472)  (0.273)  (0.065) 
Years of education  0.149  0.360  0.106  0.024 
 (0.029)*** (0.100)*** (0.017)***  (0.004)***
Considers self environmentalist  1.632  5.385  0.877  0.157 
 (0.146)*** (0.502)*** (0.085)***  (0.016)***
Environmental organization 
member 0.456  1.253  0.380  0.061 
 (0.232)**  (0.881)  (0.163)**  (0.032)* 
Age 0.018  0.064  0.008  0.001 
 (0.005)*** (0.018)*** (0.003)***  (0.001) 
Female 0.025  0.458  0.012  -0.005 
 (0.140)  (0.456)  (0.079)  (0.016) 
Black -0.918  -2.772  -0.439  -0.070 
 (0.242)*** (0.755)*** (0.127)***  (0.030)** 
Asian -0.161  -0.780  -0.191  0.011 
 (0.432)  (1.616)  (0.294)  (0.072) 
American Indian  -0.310  -0.748  -0.134  -0.027 
 (0.557)  (1.970)  (0.300)  (0.063) 
Other 0.083  0.329  0.088  0.039 
 (0.309)  (1.038)  (0.186)  (0.035) 
Hispanic 0.156  0.343  0.079  0.019 
 (0.240)  (0.782)  (0.142)  (0.028) 34 
Household size  0.169  0.506  0.105  0.018 
 (0.057)*** (0.182)*** (0.033)***  (0.007)***
Homeowner 0.616  1.921  0.339  0.062 
 (0.187)*** (0.605)*** (0.104)***  (0.023)***
Married -0.204  -0.516  -0.063  -0.019 
 (0.164)  (0.533)  (0.091)  (0.019) 
Household head  -0.233  -0.974  -0.121  -0.034 
 (0.201)  (0.647)  (0.109)  (0.022) 
$/month spent on bottled water  0.004  0.020  0.001  -0.001 
 (0.007)  (0.024)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Use bottled water in car  -0.004  -0.024  -0.003  0.013 
 (0.140)  (0.462)  (0.079)  (0.017) 
Times reuse bottles  -0.165  -1.406  -0.036  0.024 
 (0.351)  (1.133)  (0.195)  (0.041) 
Urban (lives in a MSA)  1.275  4.058  0.666  0.133 
 (0.208)*** (0.649)*** (0.110)***  (0.026)***
Northeast 0.779  2.725  0.499  0.115 
 (0.265)*** (0.880)*** (0.156)***  (0.026)***
South -1.043  -3.069  -0.503  -0.082 
 (0.199)*** (0.615)*** (0.100)***  (0.021)***
West -0.402  -1.489  -0.271  -0.036 
 (0.275)  (0.872)*  (0.148)*  (0.032) 
Year 2009   0.114  0.398  0.075  0.007 
 (0.160)  (0.528)  (0.091)  (0.019) 
Constant -0.576  -11.013     
 (0.740)  (2.460)***    
    
a Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% 
level; robust standard errors in parentheses for the OLS, Ordered Logit, and Probit regressions; 
standard errors in parentheses for the Tobit regression.  R squared = 0.24 for OLS regression.  
Probit coefficients have been transformed to correspond to marginal effects.  The regressions 
also include dummy variables for missing data for environmentalist, environmental organization 
membership, and times reuse bottles.  These variables were not statistically significant in the 
equations.  Sample size = 3,158. 35 
Table 5:  Regressions of Number of Bottles Recycled Including Interaction Effects
a 
  Number out of 10 
bottles, OLS 
  
State has deposit law  0.571 
 (0.229)** 
State has deposit law covering water bottles  3.638 
 (0.489)*** 
State has mandatory recycling or provides an opportunity to 
recycle 2.345 
 (0.410)*** 
State requires a recycling plan  0.589 
 (0.416) 




Considers self environmentalist  1.825 
 (0.349)*** 
State with deposit law covering water bottles x Income/1,000  -0.137 
 (0.042)*** 
State with deposit law covering water bottles x Considers 
self environmentalist  -1.165 
 (0.357)*** 
State has mandatory recycling or provides an opportunity to 
recycle x Income/1,000  -0.045 
 (0.044) 
State has mandatory recycling or provides an opportunity to 
recycle x Considers self environmentalist  -0.388 
 (0.407) 
State requires a recycling plan x Income/1,000  0.005 
 (0.048) 
State requires a recycling plan x Considers self 
environmentalist 0.226 
 (0.430) 
    
a Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% 
level; robust standard errors in parentheses for the OLS regression. R squared = 0.24.  The 
regression also includes all of the other variables listed in Table 4, as well as dummy variables 
for missing data for environmentalist, environmental organization membership, and times reuse 
bottles.  These variables were not statistically significant in the equations.  Sample size = 3,158. 36 
Table 6:  Probit Regressions of Use of Curbside Recycling
a 
 
  Use curbside recycling 
  
State has deposit law  0.019 
 (0.032) 
State has deposit law covering water bottles  0.019 
 (0.048) 
State has mandatory recycling or provides an 
opportunity to recycle  0.257 
 (0.029)*** 
State requires a recycling plan  0.068 
 (0.030)** 




Highest income category  -0.044 
 (0.061) 
Years of education  0.026 
 (0.004)*** 
Considers self environmentalist  0.120 
 (0.020)*** 





















 (0.022) 37 
Household head  -0.039 
 (0.028) 
$/month spent on bottled water  -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Use bottled water in car  -0.008 
 (0.019) 
Times reuse bottles  -0.052 
 (0.047) 








Year 2009   0.002 
 (0.022) 
   
a Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% 
level; robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to reflect 
marginal effects.  The regression also includes dummy variables for missing data for 
environmentalist, environmental organization membership, and times reuse bottles.  Sample size 
= 3,158. 38 
Table 7:  Probit Regressions of Recycling Behaviors
a    
    
 Return  to 
recycling center 






State has deposit law  0.102 0.104  -0.005 
  (0.026)*** (0.019)***  (0.023) 
State has deposit law covering water 
bottles  0.153 0.020  0.174 
  (0.043)*** (0.014)  (0.043)*** 
State has mandatory recycling or provides 
an opportunity to recycle  -0.040 -0.008  -0.019 
  (0.022)* (0.005)  (0.021) 
State requires a recycling plan  0.013 -0.012  0.028 
  (0.023) (0.006)*  (0.022) 
State requires a recycling goal  -0.049 -0.006  -0.028 
  (0.037) (0.010)  (0.036) 
Income/10,000  -0.006 -0.001  -0.004 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)  (0.002)* 
Highest income category  -0.015 -0.004  -0.020 
  (0.046) (0.011)  (0.042) 
Years of education  -0.002 -0.002  0.000 
  (0.003) (0.001)*  (0.003) 
Considers self environmentalist  0.063 0.003  0.055 
  (0.016)*** (0.004)  (0.015)*** 
Environmental organization member  0.023 0.001  0.035 
  (0.029) (0.007)  (0.027) 
Age  -0.001 -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.000)** (0.001) 
Female  -0.015 -0.008  -0.008 
  (0.015) (0.004)** (0.014) 
Black  -0.046 0.009  -0.047 
  (0.022)** (0.009)  (0.020)** 
Asian  0.060 -0.010  0.069 
  (0.051) (0.006)  (0.050) 
American Indian  -0.050 0.007  -0.042 
  (0.051) (0.022)  (0.046) 
Other  0.012 0.017  -0.012 
  (0.032) (0.011)  (0.029) 39 
Hispanic  -0.016 -0.007  0.005 
  (0.023) (0.004)  (0.022) 
Household size  0.005 0.001  0.003 
  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.005) 
Homeowner  0.037 0.001  0.018 
  (0.018)** (0.004)  (0.017) 
Married  -0.004 0.001  -0.007 
  (0.017) (0.004)  (0.016) 
Household head  0.004 0.001  -0.001 
  (0.021) (0.005)  (0.019) 
$/month spent on bottled water  0.000 -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) 
Use bottled water in car  0.025 0.001  0.030 
  (0.015)* (0.004)  (0.014)** 
Times reuse bottles  -0.004 0.005  -0.007 
  (0.035) (0.009)  (0.033) 
Urban (lives in a MSA)  -0.108 0.004  -0.117 
  (0.023)*** (0.005)  (0.022)*** 
Northeast  0.034 -0.001  0.018 
  (0.031) (0.008)  (0.029) 
South  0.011 -0.004  0.009 
  (0.021) (0.007)  (0.020) 
West  0.072 -0.006  0.069 
  (0.031)** (0.007)  (0.029)** 
Year 2009   0.013 0.003  0.012 
  (0.017) (0.005)  (0.016) 
    
a Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% 
level; robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients have been transformed to reflect the 
marginal effects on the probability of returns.  The regressions also include dummy variables for 
missing data for environmentalist, environmental organization membership, and times reuse 
bottles.  Sample size = 3,158.40 
Table 8:  Percentage Distribution of Number Recycled out of 10 Bottles for Oregon and 
Connecticut Before and After the Inclusion of Water Bottles to the Bottle Bill 
 
  Number out of every 10 bottles recycled  Percent Who 
Return for 
Deposit    Raw #  0  1-7  8-10  Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
Full sample (%)  100 29.1 13.4 57.5  6.08 
(4.38)  4.1 
Oregon before water 
deposits  38  15.8 18.4 65.8  7.24 
(3.99)  15.8 
Oregon after water 
deposits  14 0  21.3  78.5  8.50 
(2.88)  64.3 
Connecticut before 
water deposits  30 3.3 20  76.7  8.00 
(3.05)  6.7 
Connecticut after 
water deposits  23 8.7  0 91.3  8.96 




68  10.3 19.1 70.6  7.57 
(3.60)  11.8 
Connecticut and 
Oregon (pooled) after 37 5.4 8.1  86.5  8.78 








  Number out of 10 
bottles, Oregon 
Number out of 10 
bottles, Oregon and 
Connecticut (pooled) 
Return for Deposit 
Probit 
 




State            
OR 1.251  5.330     0.123   
 (0.646)*  (2.497)**     (0.060)***   
OR and 
CT 
(pooled)     1.684  6.023 
 
0.084 
     (0.444)*** (1.868)***    (0.040)*** 
Year 2009   0.275  0.907  0.227  0.694  0.002  0.001 
 (0.180)  (0.605)  (0.183)  (0.610)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Interaction            
OR x 
Year 
2009   0.988  4.976      0.298   




2009       0.763  5.446    0.085 
     (0.669)  (3.397)    (0.063)** 
Constant 5.986  7.463  5.958 7.373     
 (0.092)***  (0.308)*** (0.092)*** (0.308)***     
 
a Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% 
level; robust standard errors in parentheses for the OLS regression.  Probit coefficients have been 
transformed have been transformed to reflect the marginal effects on the probability of returns.  
The mean inteff results are 0.483 (interaction), 0.141 (standard error), and 3.420 (z-statistic) for 
the Oregon probit regression, and they are 0.169 (interaction), 0.084 (standard error), and 2.018 




Appendix A. Sample Characteristics and Survey Questions 
 
Appendix Table A1:  Comparison of KN Sample to the National Adult Population
a 








Do Not Use 
Bottled Water 
(n=2,055) 
 Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent 
Gender        
       Male  48.4  48.1  44.2  54.1 
       Female  51.6  51.9  55.8  45.9 
Age        
       18 - 24 years old  12.6  7.9  8.7  6.7 
       25 - 34 years old  17.9  13.6  14.9  11.5 
       35 - 44 years old  18.8  19.1  21.0  16.2 
       45 - 54 years old  19.6  21.1  22.1  19.6 
       55 - 64 years old  14.8  20.6  19.7  22.0 
       64 - 74 years old  8.7  12.0  10.3  14.6 
       75 years old or older  7.7  5.8  3.4  9.5 
Educational Attainment         
       Less than HS  14.2  11.1  10.1  12.6 
       HS Diploma or higher  58.8  60.0  59.7  60.4 
       Bachelor or higher  26.9  29.0  30.2  27.0 
Race / Ethnicity         
        White  81.3  81.9  79.6  85.3 
        Black/African-American  11.7  10.0  11.5  7.8 
        American Indian or Alaska Native  2.4  1.3  1.4  1.1 
        Asian/Pacific Islander/Other  4.6  6.6  7.4  5.6 
        Hispanic  13.5  9.5  10.3  8.3 
Marital Status         
       Married  55.0  58.2  60.9  54.1 
       Single (never married)  26.0  21.4  20.9  22.2 
       Divorced  10.4  12.6  11.5  14.4 
       Widowed  6.4  5.5  4.5  7.0 
Household Income         
       Less than $15,000  13.3  11.5  9.1  15.2 
       $15,000 to $24,999  11.6  9.8  8.6  11.6 
       $25,000 to $34,999  10.7  10.4  9.1  12.4 
       $35,000 to $49,999  14.2  16.8  16.0  18.0 
       $50,000 to $74,999  18.2  20.8  22.6  18.1 
       $75,000 or more  32.0  30.8  34.8  24.6 
 
a U. S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/).  2008 adult population (18 years+). 43 
Appendix Table A2:  Survey Questions Pertaining to Bottled Water 
WELCOME.  
Welcome to our survey on the value of drinking water quality.  This survey was put together by 
researchers at Vanderbilt and Duke Universities to help the government understand your views 
on the value of drinking water quality.  The survey should take less than half an hour to 
complete, and you may stop at any time. 
 
We hope that you will find this survey interesting. Thanks very much for your responses. 
 
For most of the questions in this survey, there are no right or wrong answers. We are simply 




How many members of your family (spouse, children, parents, or other relatives) currently live 











[SHOW IF HHSIZE = 1 OR REFUSED] 
FAM2A.  
For the rest of this survey, when a question refers to your family or members of your family who 




[SHOW IF HHSIZE > 1] 
FAM2B.  
For the rest of this survey, when a question refers to you, think of it as referring to you and the 










Do you use bottled water?  (distilled, filtered, or spring water bought in small bottles, gallon 
jugs, or a water cooler) 
 
Yes, in the home .................................................1 
Yes, at work ........................................................2 
Yes, while exercising ..........................................3 
Yes, in the car .....................................................4 
Yes, other (specify)_________ ...........................5 




 [ASK IF REMEDY4=1 – 5: ANY YES ANSWER] 
EXPENSE1.  
How much would you estimate that your household spends each month on bottled water?  
 
$1 or Less ............................................................1 
More than $1 up to $5 .........................................2 
More than $5 up to $10 .......................................3 
More than $10 up to $25 .....................................4 
More than $25 up to $40 .....................................5 
Over $40 per month ............................................6 




[ASK IF REMEDY4=1 – 5: ANY YES ANSWER] 
BOTKIND1. 















[ASK IF REMEDY4=1 – 5: ANY YES ANSWER] 
BOTKIND2.  
How do you most often buy your bottled water? 
 
Single serving bottles 
Gallon jugs 
Containers larger than one gallon 
 
 
[ASK IF REMEDY4=1 – 5: ANY YES ANSWER] 
BOTBUY.  
In the last month, what kinds of bottled water have you purchased? 
 
Plastic bottles ......................................................1 
Glass bottles ........................................................2 
Plastic gallon jugs ...............................................3 
Water cooler containers ......................................4 
Other (specify)_______ ......................................5 
 
 
[ASK IF BOTBUY=1] 
BOTRECP.  
In the last month, have you recycled your empty plastic water bottles using…  
 
Curbside recycling ..............................................1 
Take recycling to a recycling station ..................2 
Return bottles for deposit ....................................3  
Bottler collects empty bottles when 
new ones are delivered ...................................4 




[ASK IF BOTBUY=2] 
BOTRECG. 
In the last month, have you recycled your empty glass bottles using… 
 
Curbside recycling ..............................................1 
Take recycling to a recycling station ..................2 
Return bottles for deposit ....................................3  
Bottler collects empty bottles when 
new ones are delivered ...................................4 
I have not recycled glass bottles .........................5 
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[ASK IF BOTBUY=3] 
BOTRECJ.  
In the last month, have you recycled your empty plastic gallon jugs using… 
 
Curbside recycling ..............................................1 
Take recycling to a recycling station ..................2 
Return bottles for deposit ....................................3  
Bottler collects empty bottles when 
new ones are delivered ...................................4 




[ASK IF BOTBUY=4] 
BOTRECW.  
In the last month, have you recycled your empty water cooler containers using… 
 
Curbside recycling ..............................................1 
Take recycling to a recycling station ..................2 
Return bottles for deposit ....................................3  
Bottler collects empty bottles when 
new ones are delivered ...................................4 




[ASK IF BOTRECP=3] 
BOTDEPP.  





[ASK IF BOTRECG=3] 
BOTDEPG.  





[ASK IF BOTRECJ=3] 
BOTDEPJ.  




[ASK IF BOTRECW=3] 
BOTDEPW.  






[ASK IF BOTBUY=1] 
BOT10P.  




[ASK IF BOTBUY=2] 
BOT10G.  




[ASK IF BOTBUY=3] 
BOT10J.  





[ASK IF BOTBUY=4] 
BOT10W. 






[ASK IF BOTBUY=1] 
BOTREUSE.  
How often do you re-fill your plastic water bottles using tap water or filtered water? 
 
Never ...............................................................................1 
Rarely (1-2 out of every 10 bottles) ................................2 
Sometimes (3-4 out of every 10 bottles) .........................3 




Consider all of the recyclable materials that you use.  Relative to your neighbors, would you say 

















      
 
 
[ASK IF STATE=CT] 
AWARE. 
Were you aware that Connecticut recently changed its bottle deposit law to include a 5 cent 
deposit on plastic water bottles? 
 
Yes 1 











Are you a member of any of the following organizations? 
 
Environmental Defense Fund .............................1  
Greenpeace ..........................................................2   
National Audubon Society ..................................3  
National Wildlife Federation  .............................4 
Nature Conservancy  ...........................................5 
Natural Resources Defense Council  ..................6 
Sierra Club  .........................................................7 
None of these ......................................................8 
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Appendix B: Bottle Deposit Laws and State Recycling Laws 
 
Concerns about diminishing landfill space have prompted many states to pass legislation 
encouraging recycling.
49  States with the highest disposal fees and limited amounts of disposal 
capacity remaining were the first to pass waste reduction legislation.  The legislation has taken 
various forms in different states; states have set waste reduction goals, required comprehensive 
local planning, adopted disposal bans, enacted mandatory provisions for source separation and 
curbside recycling, and required refundable deposits on containers. 
Bottle Deposit Laws 
A bottle deposit bill, or container deposit law, requires a refundable deposit on beverage 
containers, usually about 5 to 10 cents, and encourages consumers to return these containers for 
recycling to receive their deposit back.
50  As of 2009, eleven states—California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oregon, and Vermont—
have bottle deposit laws.  These states represent 29% of the U.S. population and 28% of our 
sample.  In our survey, five of these states—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, and 
Oregon—included deposits on bottled water in their regulatory scheme.
51  Most states have a 
modest 5 cent deposit on beverages; only Michigan has a 10 cent deposit on all covered 
beverages.  Six states retain the unredeemed deposits, which provide state revenue in the 
millions.
52  Many states without bottle deposit bills are contemplating such legislation.  Seven 
states considered new deposit bills and three states considered updates to their existing deposit 
                                                      
49 For discussion of the legal and policy context for the emergence of recycling laws see Tchobanoglous and Kreith 
(2002) and Gaba and Stever (2008). 
50 The exact deposit system can vary from state to state.  The Bottle Bill Resource Guide, 
www.bottlebill.org/about.htm, provides information on each state’s bottle bill. 
51 Connecticut’s addition of bottled water to its bottle deposit scheme was implemented on October 1, 2009.  New 
York had already passed a bill that would add bottled water, but a court order delayed implementation of this bill 
until October 30, 2009, which was after the final round of the survey used for this paper. 
52 This statistic includes Michigan, which has a mixed system, but does not include New York, which passed a bill 
that would create a mixed system, but implementation of this bill was delayed to past the scope of this paper.   50 
bills in 2009.
53  Connecticut and New York both passed updated bills allowing the state to retain 
unredeemed deposits.
54  While Connecticut’s update has already been implemented, New York’s 
update has been delayed by a court ruling.
55  The seven states with new deposit bill proposals 
were Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, and West 
Virginia.  Most of these state bills proposed bottle deposits of at least 10 cents—with Florida’s 
bill proposing 20 to 30 cent deposits.
56  Florida’s bill is the only bill to propose that bottlers 
retain unclaimed deposits; the rest proposed that the state retains unredeemed deposits.
57  All 
proposed laws, except New Hampshire’s, would cover water bottles.  
State Recycling Laws  
State laws that mandate source separation and recycling or ban disposal of certain 
materials in almost all municipalities were especially popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Many of these laws require all municipalities, counties, or cities to establish pick-up of separated 
materials at curbside or other convenient locations.
58  These kinds of programs are usually 
implemented at the municipality or county level,
59 but statewide recycling initiatives are also 
possible.  For example, Pennsylvania requires all municipalities with more than 5,000 people to 
offer curbside recycling.  In 2004, there were 974 curbside recycling programs in Pennsylvania, 
                                                      
53 Maryland only considered setting up a task force to study the possibility of a bottle deposit, so it was not included 
in this statistic. 
54 New York’s bill would also add water bottles to its list of bottles covered by the deposit.  
55 Confessore, Nicholas. Bottle Bill, Bottled Up, City Room, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2009), available at 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/bottle-bill-bottled-up/?scp=1-
b&sq=bottle+deposit+new+york&st=nyt. 
56 Only Tennessee and one West Virginia bill proposed 5 cent deposits. 
57 New Jersey’s bill proposed a mixed retention plan, where the state retains 75 percent of the unredeemed deposits. 
58 Kinnaman (2005, 2006) finds that about 18 to 22 states mandate curbside recycling.  Because we did not have this 
information for 2008, we group states with comprehensive statewide recycling provisions with those with mandatory 
curbside recycling programs.  
59 In 2007, more than 8,600 curbside recyclables collection programs were reported in the United States (EPA 
2007).  The EPA (2007) found that 84 percent, 76 percent, 61 percent, and 30 percent of the populations in the 
Northeast, West, Midwest, and South, respectively, were served by curbside recycling.  These percentages are 
calculated based on the populations in states reporting data. 51 
serving roughly 80% of the population.
60  In addition to the curbside recycling requirement, 
Pennsylvania requires all citizens to separate at least three materials from their other waste and to 
store the materials until collection.  Connecticut, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, New 
York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have passed similar “mandatory” recycling laws.  Table B1 
summarizes these laws and provides excerpts from key provisions of the laws. 
Other states have required all municipalities to give residents an “opportunity to recycle.”  
Minnesota, for example, requires all counties to make curbside pickup or collection centers for 
recyclable materials available at sites that are convenient for residents to use.  In 2004, there 
were 730 curbside recycling programs in Minnesota, serving roughly 72% of the population.
61  
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Nevada,
62 Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington have passed 
similar laws ensuring adequate recycling opportunities for their populations.  These laws are 
grouped with mandatory recycling laws in Table B1. 
Many states have sought to encourage recycling at the local level by either requiring local 
governments to consider recycling initiatives in their waste reduction plans or setting statewide 
recycling goals.  The local planning requirements frequently force counties or municipalities to 
assess their current recycling programs and to consider more comprehensive programs in the 
future.  All of the states that have mandatory recycling or opportunity to recycle programs, 
except Nevada, have planning requirements and most have a statewide recycling goal.  The 
                                                      
60 The number of curbside recycling programs and the population with access to curbside collection (10,000,000) 
was taken from Simmons et al. (2006).  The percentage of the population with access to curbside collection was 
calculated using Pennsylvania’s estimated population in 2004, prepared by the State Data Center of the 
Pennsylvania State University (12,406,292), available at 
http://www.dsf.health.state.pa.us/health/lib/health/Vital_Stat/2004/2004_statepop.pdf.  
61 The number of curbside recycling programs and the population with access to curbside collection (3,750,000) is 
from Simmons et al. (2006).  The percentage of the population with access to curbside collection was calculated 
using Minnesota’s estimated population in 2005, prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau (5,174,743), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/SummaryTabA1.pdf.  
62 Although only two counties meet Nevada's high county population cut-off of 100,000 or more for the 
requirements (Clark County and Washoe County), this cut-off still covers about 88 percent of  Nevada's population.  52 
remaining states that have a planning requirement are summarized in Table B2, which provides 
documentation of the applicable laws.  Finally, the states that only have a statewide recycling 
goal are summarized in Table B3, which also lists the specified recycling goal amount.  It is not 
clear whether such goals are followed by policies that are implemented in order to achieve these 
goals. 53 


















Stat. Ann. § 
9-500.07. 
 
"A city or town shall provide its residents 
with an opportunity to engage in recycling 









"Each regional solid waste management 
board shall ensure that its residents have an 
opportunity to recycle." 
 
Yes (40%) 





"The Commissioner of Environmental 
Protection shall adopt regulations... 
designating items that are required to be 
recycled.... Each person who generates 
solid waste from residential property 
shall… separate from other solid waste the 
items designated for recycling pursuant to 





D.C. Code § 
8-1007. 
"Occupants of residential property shall 
separate from their solid waste and 
separately bundle or containerize all yard 
waste and newspaper for recycling… [and] 
all metals and glass in 1 container."  
 
Yes (45%) 
Florida   Opportunity to 
recycle 
Fla. Stat. § 
403.706.  
"A county with a population of 100,000 or 
less may provide its residents with the 
opportunity to recycle in lieu of achieving 
the goal set forth in paragraph (a)." 
 
Yes (30%) 




"Counties shall ensure that residents, 
including residents of single and 




Nevada   Opportunity to 
recycle 
Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 
444A.040. 
"The board of county commissioners in a 
county whose population is 100,000 or 
more, or its designee, shall make available 
for use in that county a program for... [t]he 
separation at the source of recyclable 
material from other solid waste ...[and] 
[t]he establishment of recycling centers for 
the collection and disposal of recyclable 
material..." 
Yes (25%) 54 


















13:1E-99.16   
 
"The governing body of each 
municipality shall adopt an ordinance 
which requires persons... to source 
separate from the municipal solid waste 
stream... the specified recyclable 











aa   
"[A] municipality shall adopt such a 
local law or ordinance to require that 
solid waste... shall be separated into 
recyclable, reuseable or other 
components for which economic 
markets for alternate uses exist." 
 
Yes (40%) 
Oregon   Opportunity 
to recycle 
Or. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 459A.005 
to .010. 
"The 'opportunity to recycle' means at 
least that the city, county or 
metropolitan service district... [p]rovides 
a place for collecting source separated 
recyclable material located either at a 
disposal site or at another location more 
convenient to the population being 
served and, if a city has a population of 
4,000 or more, collection at least once a 
month of source separated recyclable 
material from collection service 




Pennsylvania   Mandatory 
recycling 
53 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 
4000.1501.  
"The source-separation and collection 
program shall include... [a]n ordinance 
or regulation adopted by the governing 
body of the municipality, requiring... 
[p]ersons to separate at least three 
materials deemed appropriate by the 
municipality from other municipal waste 
generated at their homes, apartments 
and other residential establishments and 


























"Each county or region submitting a solid 
waste management plan... shall provide its 
residents with the opportunity to recycle the 
categories of solid waste materials 
designated in the county or regional solid 




Washington   Opportunity to 
recycle 
Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 
70.95.090. 
"In urban areas, these programs shall 
include collection of source separated 
recyclable materials from single and 
multiple family residences... In rural areas, 
these programs shall include but not be 
limited to drop-off boxes, buy-back centers, 
or a combination of both, at each solid 
waste transfer, processing, or disposal site, 









Code Ann. § 
22-15A-18.  
"Each municipality with a population of ten 
thousand or more people… shall establish 
and commence implementation of a source 
separation and curbside collection program 
for recyclable materials." 
 
Yes (50%) 






"No person may dispose of in a solid waste 
disposal facility or burn without energy 
recovery in a solid waste treatment facility 
in this state any of the following: [e.g., 
aluminum cans, newspaper and other paper, 
foam packaging, glass bottles, magazines, 
plastic containers, etc.]." 
No 
 
Notes: All of these states, except Nevada, have a planning requirement. 
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Appendix Table B2: States that require regional waste management plans 
with recycling considerations 
 




Alabama   Ala. Code § 22-27-45.  Yes (25%) 
California   Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 41821.  Yes (50%) 
Hawaii   Haw. Rev. Stat. § 342G-26.  Yes (50%) 
Illinois   415 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 15/4.   Yes (25%) 
Iowa   Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.306.  Yes (50%) 
Maine   Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 
2133. 
Yes (50%) 
Maryland   Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 9-505.  Yes (20%) 
Michigan   Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 
324.11533 to .11538. 
No 
Nebraska   Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-2031 to 
2032. 
Yes (50%) 
New Mexico  N. M. S. A. 1978, §§ 74-9-4 - 7.  Yes (50%) 
North 
Carolina  
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 130A-
309.03. 
Yes (40%) 
Ohio   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
3734.53. 
No 
Tennessee   Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-211-813.  Yes (25%) 
Texas   Tex. Health & Safety Code 
Ann. § 363.062. 
Yes (40%) 
Virginia   Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-1411.  Yes (25%) 
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Appendix Table B3: States that only have a recycling or waste reduction goal 
State Source  Goal  Amount 
Louisiana   La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:2413.   25% 
Mississippi  Miss. Code Ann. § 17-17-221    25% (waste reduction) 
Montana   Mont. Code Ann. § 75-10-803.  17% 
New Hampshire   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 149-M:2.  40% (waste reduction) 
Rhode Island   R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 23-18.8-2 to 
.12-3. 
35% (recycling waste); 50% 
(recycling beverage containers) 
South Dakota  SDCL § 34A-6-60  50% (waste reduction) 
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Appendix C. Supplementary Tables 
Appendix Table C1:  Recycling Perceptions Relative to Neighbors 











Overall Sample  10.44%  7.66%  41.10%  24.09%  16.70% 
Non-Bottled Water Users  8.62%  6.82%  42.99%  23.75%  17.82% 
Bottled Water Users  11.22%  8.03%  40.29%  24.24%  16.22% 
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Appendix Table C2:  Regressions of Number of Bottles Recycled: Urban/Non-Urban and  




  Number out of 10 bottles, OLS by Subgroup 
  Urban Non-urban Environmentalist  Non-
environmentalist
        
State with deposit law  0.564  0.885  0.293  0.827 
 (0.246)**  (0.620)  (0.322)  (0.323)** 
State with deposit law covering 
water bottles  2.100  2.101  2.226  2.048 
 (0.349)***  (1.005)**  (0.444)***  (0.466)*** 
State has mandatory recycling or 
provides an opportunity to recycle  1.884  1.898  1.822  1.870 
 (0.245)***  (0.595)***  (0.346)***  (0.291)*** 
State requires a recycling plan  0.781  0.379  0.604  0.764 
 (0.254)***  (0.553)  (0.369)  (0.292)*** 
State requires a recycling goal  -0.412  -0.661  -0.889  -0.245 
 (0.497)  (0.703)  (0.829)  (0.458) 
Income/10,000 0.085  -0.034  0.036  0.100 
 (0.022)***  (0.069)  (0.030)  (0.030)*** 
Highest income category  -0.659  1.415  0.563  -1.121 
 (0.395)*  (3.325)  (0.427)  (0.595)* 
Years of education  0.165  0.034  0.126  0.167 
 (0.031)***  (0.083)  (0.042)***  (0.041)*** 
Considers self environmentalist  1.646  1.683     
 (0.155)***  (0.445)***     
Environmental organization 
member 0.398  0.522  0.505  0.623 
 (0.238)*  (0.712)  (0.261)*  (0.524) 
Age 0.014  0.038  0.003  0.029 
 (0.006)**  (0.015)***  (0.008)  (0.007)*** 
Female 0.147  -0.604  0.459  -0.295 
 (0.151)  (0.390)  (0.209)**  (0.189) 
Black -0.952  -0.377  -1.174  -0.715 
 (0.256)***  (0.802)  (0.421)***  (0.303)** 
Asian -0.219  1.133  -0.253  0.008 
 (0.435)  (1.010)  (0.571)  (0.657) 
American Indian  -0.291  -0.199  0.332  -0.768 
 (0.628)  (1.224)  (0.759)  (0.762) 
Other 0.078  -0.097  -0.637  0.762 
 (0.336)  (0.876)  (0.485)  (0.401)* 
Hispanic 0.151  0.793  0.484  -0.043 
 (0.251)  (0.851)  (0.333)  (0.335) 60 
Household size  0.114  0.482  0.256  0.144 
 (0.062)*  (0.144)***  (0.081)***  (0.074)* 
Homeowner 0.691  0.215  0.696  0.539 
 (0.200)***  (0.525)  (0.282)**  (0.248)** 
Married -0.011  -1.058  -0.426  -0.056 
 (0.177)  (0.436)**  (0.233)*  (0.223) 
Household head  -0.257  -0.300  0.185  -0.489 
 (0.220)  (0.510)  (0.309)  (0.262)* 
$/month spent on bottled water  0.004  0.021  -0.001  0.005 
 (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Use bottled water in car  -0.034  0.181  0.095  -0.152 
 (0.151)  (0.407)  (0.205)  (0.191) 
Times reuse bottles  -0.227  0.087  -0.585  0.044 
 (0.381)  (0.902)  (0.524)  (0.468) 
Urban (lives in a MSA)      1.316  1.209 
     (0.339)***  (0.267)*** 
Northeast 0.786  0.835  0.026  1.364 
 (0.287)***  (0.721)  (0.375)  (0.370)*** 
South -0.958  -1.645  -1.120  -0.963 
 (0.219)***  (0.517)***  (0.301)***  (0.266)*** 
West -0.408  -0.198  -0.948  -0.052 
 (0.297)  (0.724)  (0.404)**  (0.373) 
Year 2009   0.093  0.427  0.094  0.175 
 (0.172)  (0.450)  (0.230)  (0.220) 
Constant 0.583  0.502  2.636  -1.518 
 (0.792)  (1.875)  (1.131)**  (0.991) 
  
a Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% 
level; robust standard errors in parentheses.  R squared = 0.22, 0.25, 0.19, and 0.22, respectively.  
The regressions also include a dummy variable for missing data for environmental organization 
membership and times reuse bottles, as well as a dummy variable for missing data for 
environmentalist in the urban/non-urban regressions.  Sample sizes are 2672, 486, 1259, and 
1883, respectively.   
 